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The effects of an unconditional move rule in the spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma, Snowdrift and Stag
Hunt games are studied. Spatial structure by itself is known to modify the outcome of many games
when compared with a randomly mixed population, sometimes promoting, sometimes inhibiting
cooperation. Here we show that random dilution and mobility may suppress the inhibiting factors
of the spatial structure in the Snowdrift game, while enhancing the already larger cooperation found
in the Prisoner’s dilemma and Stag Hunt games.
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INTRODUCTION
Competition and cooperation are two inseparable sides
of the same coin. While competition is a key concept
in Darwin’s theory of evolution, cooperation is rather
puzzling, yet ubiquitous in nature [18]. How coopera-
tive behavior evolved among self-interested individuals
is an important open question in biology and social sci-
ences, along with the issue of how cooperation contends
with competition in order to achieve global and individ-
ual optima. A powerful tool to analyze these problems is
evolutionary game theory [12, 17, 31], an application of
the mathematical theory of games to biological contexts.
Of particular relevance are two-player games where each
player has a strategy space containing two possible ac-
tions (2×2 games), to cooperate (C) or to defect (D). The
payoff of a player depends on its action and on the one of
its co-player. Assuming pairwise, symmetric interaction
between the players, there are four possible values for
this payoff. Cooperation involves a cost to the provider
and a benefit to the recipient. Two cooperators thus
get a reward R while two defectors get a punishment P .
The trade between a cooperator and a defector gives the
temptation T for the latter, while the former receives the
sucker’s payoff, S. We renormalize all values such that
R = 1 and P = 0. The ranking of the above quantities
defines the game they are playing. The paradigmatic ex-
ample is the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game in which
the four payoffs are ranked as T > R > P > S. It clearly
pays more to defect whatever the opponent’s strategy:
the gain will be T > R if the other cooperates and P > S
if he defects. The dilemma appears since if both play D
they get P , what is worse than the reward R they would
have obtained had they both played C. The PD is re-
lated with two other social dilemma games [16, 21]. In
most animal contests (in particular those involving esca-
lating conflicts), mutual defection is the worst possible
outcome for both players, and the damage exceeds the
cost of being exploited, i.e. T > R > S > P . This
game is called chicken [22] or snowdrift (SD). On the
other hand, when the reward surpasses the temptation
to defect, i.e. R > T > P > S, the game becomes the
Stag Hunt (SH) [23]. The coordination of slime molds is
an example of animal behavior that has been described
as a stag hunt [24]. When individual amoebae of Dic-
tyostelium discoideum are starving, they aggregate to
form one large body whose reproductive success depends
on the cooperation of many individuals. Here, we con-
sider for T > 1 the PD (S < 0) and the SD (S > 0),
whose interface (S = 0) is known as the weak form of the
PD game, with S = P = 0. The Stag Hunt (SH) game
is obtained for S < 0 and T < 1.
Classical evolutionary game theory constitutes a mean-
field-like approximation which does not include the effect
of spatial, correlated structures of populations. Axel-
rod [3] suggested to place the agents on a two-dimensional
spatial array interacting with their neighbors. This cel-
lular automaton was explored by Nowak and May [20],
who found that such spatial structure allows cooperators
to build clusters in which the benefits of mutual coop-
eration can outweigh losses against defectors, thus en-
abling cooperation to be sustained, in contrast with the
2spatially unstructured game, where defection is always
favored. The original Nowak-May model was extended
and modified in several different ways (see ref. [25] and
references therein). Related to the present work, the ef-
fects of dilution and mobility were recently studied in
refs. [27, 29] in the weak form of the PD game.
Mobility effects are difficult to anticipate. When non-
assortative movements are included, the effective number
of neighbors increases (towards the randommixing limit).
Moreover, those clusters so necessary to sustain cooper-
ation may now evaporate. Both these effects promote
defection and the number of cooperators is expected to
decrease. On the other hand, dilution [2] and mobility
decrease the competition for local resources and help to
avoid retaliation and abuse (although that may require
more contingent movements), thus tending to increase
cooperation. In the evolutionary game context, diffusion
was studied by several authors, sometimes as a cost to
wander between patches without spatial structure [4, 5]
or as a trait connected with laying offspring within a
given dispersal range [8, 14, 15, 30]. An explicit diffusive
process was studied in the framework of the replicator
equation [12], extended to include a diffusive term [6, 7];
however, the interactions were still mean field like. Ak-
tipis [1] considered contingent movement of cooperators
with a “win-stay, lose-move” rule, allowing them to in-
vade a population of defectors and resist further inva-
sions. Models with alternating viscosities, which reflect
different stages of development that can benefit from the
clusterization of cooperators or from dispersal, have also
been considered and promote altruism, since the high vis-
cosity phase allows interactions between close relatives
and the low viscosity phase reduces the disadvantages
of local competition among related individuals. In cases
of populations with only a highly viscous phase, the ef-
fects of interactions among relatives and competition for
local resources tend to balance and thus the evolution
of altruistic behavior is inhibited [26, 32]. Differently
from previous works, ref. [29] considered a diluted ver-
sion of Nowak-May’s spatial PD model where individu-
als are able to perform random walks on the lattice when
there is enough free space (the non-assortative “always-
move” strategy). Specifically, the setting was the sim-
plest possible: random diffusion of simple, memoryless,
unconditional, non-retaliating, strategy-pure agents. Un-
der these conditions, cooperation was found not only to
be possible and robust but, for a broad range of the pa-
rameters (density, viscosity, etc), often enhanced when
compared to the strongly viscous (no mobility) case. The
parameters chosen put the model at the interface between
the PD and the SD, and a natural question is how robust
is the behavior when S < P , that is, in a genuine PD
game? Moreover, how does mobility affect other games,
like the SD or the SH? Recently, Jian-Yue et al [13] ex-
tended the results of ref. [29] for the SD game and COD
dynamics (see next section), but with a restricted choice
of S and T . Another relevant question regards the exis-
tence of any fundamental difference between those games
when mobility is introduced. In particular, in those cases
where the spatial structure is known to inhibit coopera-
tion [11], does mobility change this picture?
Our objective here is to present a more comprehensive
analysis and extend our previous study in several direc-
tions, trying to shed some light on the above questions.
The paper is organized as follows. The following sec-
tion describes the details of the model and simulation.
Then, we present the results for two possible implemen-
tations depending on the order of the diffusive and off-
spring steps. Finally, we present our conclusions and
discuss some implications of the results.
THE MODEL
The model is a two dimensional stochastic cellular au-
tomaton in which cells are either occupied by uncondi-
tional players (cooperators or not) or vacant. At time t,
the variable Si(t) is 0 if the corresponding lattice cell is
empty, or ±1 depending on whether the agent at that site
cooperates (1) or defects (−1). The relevant quantity is
the normalized fraction of cooperators, ρc, after the sta-
tionary state is attained, defined as ρc = (1 +M/ρ)/2,
where M is the “magnetization” M = N−1
∑
i
〈Si(∞)〉,
N is the system size and ρ 6= 0 is the fraction of occupied
sites, that is kept fixed at all times (when ρ 6= 1, we call
the system diluted). The symbol 〈. . .〉 stands for an av-
erage over the ensemble of initial configurations. We call
“active” a site that has changed strategy since the previ-
ous step. At each time step, all individuals play against
all its four nearest neighbors (if present), collecting the
payoff from the combats. After that, it may either move
or try to generate its offspring. We consider a best-takes-
all reproduction: each player compares its total payoff
with those of its nearest neighbors and changes strategy
following the one (including itself) with the greatest pay-
off among them. This strategy changing updating rule
preserves the total number of individuals, thus keeping ρ
constant. If a tie among some of the neighbors occurs,
one of them is randomly chosen. During the diffusive
part, each agent makes an attempt to jump to a nearest
neighbor site chosen randomly, that is accepted, provided
the site is empty, with a probability given by the mobil-
ity parameter m. Notice that m does not measure the
effective mobility, that depends on both m and ρ, but
only a tendency to move, space allowing. However, dif-
ferent combinations of both parameters could give the
same effective mobility (measured, for example, through
the mean square displacement), but that parameter alone
would not suffice to characterize the game, since spa-
tial correlations are determined by ρ. Among the sev-
eral ways of implementing the reproductive and diffusive
steps, here we consider two possibilities, named contest-
3offspring-diffusion (COD) and contest-diffusion-offspring
(CDO). In the former, as the name says, each step con-
sists of combats followed by the generation of offspring
done in parallel, and then diffusion, while in the latter,
the diffusion and offspring steps are reversed. Of course,
the stochasticity introduced by the mobility disappears
under some conditions (e.g., ρ = 1 or m = 0), and the
final outcome may now depend on the initial conditions.
We explore many choices of the payoff parameters T
and S while P and R are kept fixed at 0 and 1, respec-
tively, and compare the effects of diffusion with those
obtained either for the related spatial weak version [29]
or for the randomly mixed limit. Square lattices of sizes
ranging from 100×100 to 500×500 with periodic bound-
ary conditions are used. Averages are performed over
at least 100 samples and equilibrium is usually attained
before 1000 network sweeps are completed, although in
some cases not even 107 sweeps are enough to bring the
system to an equilibrium fixed point. The initial configu-
ration has ρN individuals placed randomly on the lattice,
equally distributed among cooperators and defectors.
RESULTS
Ref. [29] considered only the weak limit P = S = 0
of the PD game for T = 1.4 and R = 1, that is, inside
the region where, for ρ = 1, both strategies coexist along
with active sites. When S 6= 0, this region may comprise
values of S both in the PD and in the SD regimes, that
is, S < 0 and S > 0, respectively. Figs. 1 and 2 show
that the results found in ref. [29] with the COD dynam-
ics remain unchanged for this rather broad range of S.
Indeed, the line labeled S = −0.1 in fig. 1 exactly super-
poses with the results for all values of S in the aforemen-
tioned interval, S = 0 included. This can be more clearly
seen in fig. 2, where ρ, m and S are varied, and a plateau
in the interval (−0.2, 2/15) [10] is observed (although the
value of ρc in the plateau depends on both ρ and m). Be-
sides this active phase, the system presents a large num-
ber of different phases, with sharp transitions between
them. For comparison, the no mobility case [28], m = 0,
is also included, as well as the cooperators density when
ρ = 1 (solid black line). The transition points, calculated
considering the several possible local neighborhoods [28],
are represented by vertical dashed and dotted lines lo-
cated at the points where S equals to (T +3P )/2−R =
−0.3, 2T + 2P − 3R = −0.2, (T + 3P − R)/3 = 2/15,
(T+3P )/4 = 0.35, T+P−R = 0.4, (2P+2T−R)/3 = 0.6
and P + T/2 = 0.7. In addition to these transitions, a
few more are introduced when the system is diluted (ver-
tical dotted lines), ρ < 1, each phase being characterized
by the fraction of cooperators and by the way they or-
ganize spatially [28]. When mobility is introduced after
the offspring generation (COD dynamics), no new tran-
sition appears. Dilution (without mobility) allows coop-
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FIG. 1: Average fraction of cooperating individuals ρc for mo-
bilities m = 0 (top) and 1 (bottom), P = 0, R = 1, T = 1.4
and several values of S in the COD case. The case S = −0.1 is
representative of the whole interval around the weak PD point
S = 0 (−0.2 < S < 2/15). Indeed, all curves in this inter-
val collapse. Notice also that near ρ = 1, negative responses
occur and ρc may decrease as S gets larger, the effect being
stronger for m = 0 (see text). At small densities, mobility is
detrimental to cooperators: isolated clusters of cooperators,
that could survive for m = 0, can be predated by mobile de-
fectors once mobility is considered. At intermediate densities,
mobility can strongly increase the amount of cooperation.
eration for small values of S (S < −0.3), which is absent
with ρ = 1. For low densities in particular, clusters are
small and isolated; therefore, depending on the initial
condition, cooperators succeed in forming pure clusters.
However, as soon as mobility is introduced, this disorder
driven phase disappears since small cooperative clusters
are easily predated by wandering defectors. In this low
density situation, cooperation is only sustained when the
exploitation is not too strong (larger values of S), as can
be seen in the case ρ = 0.3 andm = 1, where cooperation
exists only for S > 0.7. For intermediate densities, some
phases may coalesce, like the large S region for ρ = 0.5
where ρc = 1. Interestingly, mobility has a non trivial
effect in the negative response that is already present at
ρ = 1 or m = 0. When the sucker’s payoff S increases
(less exploitation), one expects higher levels of coopera-
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FIG. 2: Average fraction of cooperating individuals ρc versus S (T = 1.4, R = 1 and P = 0) in the SD (S > 0) and PD (S < 0)
games with COD dynamics for different values of the mobility and ρ. The solid black line is the case ρ = 1. The vertical
dashed lines locate the transition points for ρ = 1 (S = −0.3, −0.2, 2/15, 0.35, 0.4, 0.6 and 0.7) and the vertical dotted lines
locate a few more when ρ < 1 (S = 0.2, 7/15, 0.8, 0.9 and 14/15), as explained in the text. The curved line is the expected
result for random mixing (ρc = 0 for the PD game, S < 0 and eq. 1 for the SD game, S > 0). The point S = 0.6 corresponds
to the standard parametrization T = 1 + r = 1.4, R = 1, S = 1 − r = 0.6 and P = 0 for the SD game, considered in [13].
For comparison, the case without mobility (m = 0), whose results are obviously independent of the diffusion dynamics, is also
shown. No new transitions appear due to mobility besides those already present when m = 0 for the COD dynamics [28]. A
further non trivial effect is also noticeable: for some fixed values of S and ρ (e.g., S = 0.5 and ρ = 0.7), there is an optimal
value of m where ρc is maximized.
tion. But the opposite behavior is sometimes observed,
and the number of cooperators may also decrease. An
example occurs when ρ = 1 as S increases beyond the
transition point 0.6, and ρc attains a new plateau, far
below the previous one. However, with mobility such
effect may be enhanced, attenuated or reverted. Fig. 2
depicts many examples of such behavior. Moreover, for a
fixed ρ, mobility affects different phases in diverse ways.
For example, for ρ = 0.5, when m changes from 0.1 to
0.5, the cooperative phase at 0.2 < S < 0.4 disappears,
while the one for 0.4 < S < 1 suffers no alteration. When
m = 1, instead, this region splits into five smaller regions.
Therefore, whether large or small mobility is better for
cooperators strongly depends on both m and ρ. For ex-
ample, for ρ = 0.9, ρc increases with m when S is large
and decreases for smaller values. The behavior of ρc as a
function of the mobility is shown in fig. 3. In some cases
cooperation is an increasing function of the mobility and
the optimal value is thus m = 1. On the other hand, it
may also be detrimental for cooperation, and ρc steadily
decreases with m. In this latter case, a non zero but very
small mobility gives the optimal value.
The most important result is obtained when we com-
pare the simulations with what one would obtain in
a large randomly mixed population. A simple mean
field [10, 12] argument leads to three possible solutions:
two absorbing states, ρc = 0 and 1, and a mixed case
with
ρc =
S
S + T − 1
, (1)
where we have already considered R = 1 and P = 0. De-
pending on the values of S and T , one of these solutions
may become the stable one. In the mean-field PD case,
there is no cooperation and ρc = 0 is the stable solution.
5 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
ρ     S
0.7  0.50
0.7  0.95
0.3  0.95
PSfrag replacements
ρ
c
m
FIG. 3: Average fraction of cooperating agents ρc as a func-
tion of the mobility m for several values of ρ and S. Notice
that ρc may either increase (m = 1 is optimal) or decrease (a
small, but non zero, m is optimal), depending on the param-
eters, and that there is a discontinuity at m = 0.
For the SH, the stable solution depends also on the initial
density of cooperators ρ0c and eq. 1 delimits the basin of
attraction of each solution: ρc = 0 if ρ
0
c
< S/(S + T − 1)
and 1 otherwise. The solution given by eq. 1, shown in
fig. 2 as a curved line, is only stable in the SD game. It
has been known that a structured spatial distribution of
agents often inhibits cooperation [11] in the SD game,
as opposed to what happens in the PD and SH games.
Nevertheless, when both dilution and mobility are in-
troduced, cooperation is not so often inhibited. Indeed,
in fig. 2 one can see that in many cases the spatially
distributed population outperforms the randomly mixed
population in terms of cooperative behavior.
Besides the PD and SD games, we also studied the
effect of mobility in the SH game. Fig. 4 shows the nor-
malized fraction of cooperators as a function of the total
density for several values of S < 0 and T = 0.9 < R = 1
when the mobility is either high (m = 1) or absent
(m = 0). Without mobility, isolated clusters of coop-
erators are able to survive and even at very low densities
cooperation is sustained. Once mobility is included, co-
operation at low densities is destroyed as small coopera-
tor clusters are easily predated by mobile defectors. On
the other hand, at higher densities cooperation is strongly
enhanced and ρc = 1 for all values of S < 0. It is interest-
ing to notice that mobility also changes the dependence
on the density: with m = 1 all curves are monotonically
increasing functions of ρ, while form = 0 they are always
decreasing for low S and non-monotonic for larger values.
The general dependence on S, for several values of the
mobility can be observed in fig. 5. No negative response
appears and the amount of cooperation increases with S,
as expected.
When the diffusion step is performed before the off-
spring laying (CDO dynamics), the amount of cooper-
ation is often strongly enhanced, as can be observed in
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FIG. 4: Average fraction of cooperating individuals ρc for
mobilities m = 0 (top) and m = 1 (bottom), P = 0, R = 1,
T = 0.9 and several values of S with COD dynamics for the
SH game. Notice the strong effect of the inclusion of mobil-
ity. The chosen values correspond to the different plateaux
seen in fig. 5. The density of cooperators is a monotonically
increasing function of the total density for m 6= 0, while it is
either non-monotonic or monotonically decreasing for m = 0.
fig. 6. Cooperators close to defectors have low payoff;
therefore, if they do not move, in the next step their
strategy will be replaced by D. On the other hand, if
they do move away, there is a probability of surviving
depending on the new neighborhood they encounter (at
low densities, for example, they may be isolated after
the move, and thus survive). Moreover, cooperators that
detach from a cooperative neighborhood have high pay-
off and may replace the defectors they find. Indeed, for
many values of the parameters ρ andm, cooperators fully
dominate the system, even in the region of small S val-
ues where the COD dynamics allows no cooperators to
survive. While all phases appearing in the COD dynam-
ics were already present when m = 0, in the CDO case
a few new phases appear. These mobility driven transi-
tions can be seen in fig. 6 and are marked by solid vertical
lines at S = −3, −2, −1, −1/2, −1/3 and 0. In partic-
ular, a new transition appears at S = 0 and, differently
from all other cases where the weak PD behavior was
representative of a wide range of values of S, in this case,
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FIG. 5: Average fraction of cooperating individuals ρc versus S (T = 0.9, R = 1 and P = 0) for different values of the mobility
and ρ in the COD case. The solid black line is the case ρ = 1, while the vertical dashed lines locate the transition points
for ρ = 1 (S = −1.2, −0.55, −0.3, −0.1 and −1/30) and the vertical dotted lines locate a few more when ρ < 1 (S = −1.1,
−0.2 and −0.05), as explained in the text. For comparison, the case without mobility (m = 0), whose results are obviously
independent of the diffusion dynamics, is also shown. No new transition appears due to mobility for the COD dynamics besides
those already present when m = 0.
although the weak and the strict PD (S < P ) still be-
have in the same way, the small-S SD becomes different.
Even though the density of the two phases is very similar,
they are in fact different since the final configurations are
slightly different even if we prepare two systems (for ex-
ample, one with S = −0.01 and the other with S = 0.01)
with identical initial conditions and subject to the same
sequence of random numbers.
DISCUSSION AND FINAL COMMENTS
The main question posed at the beginning was how
mobility affects the outcome of different games beyond
the weak dilemma at the frontier between the PD and
the SD studied in Ref. [29]. A main novelty emerges in
the context of the SD game: mobility restores the en-
hancing factor of the spatial structure also found in the
PD game, at variance with the m = 0 case where coop-
eration is usually lower than the fully mixed case [11]. In
general, when agents are able to randomly diffuse on the
lattice, unmatched levels of cooperation can be attained
for wide ranges of the parameters. Moreover, differently
from the PD and SH games, the spatial SD presents neg-
ative responses when the value of S increases: instead of
enhancing the amount of cooperation as one would ex-
pect, ρc sometimes decreases. This effect, absent in the
fully mixed case, is also observed even in the absence of
mobility, something that has not been previously noticed.
Cooperators are spatially organized in different ways de-
pending on the game they play. For example, the clusters
may be more compact or filamentous. This spatial struc-
ture rules the effect that mobility has on the fate of the
game.
We considered three regions of interest in the T and S
plane, the genuine Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game (T > 1
and S < 0), the Snowdrift (SD) game (T > 1 and S > 0)
and the Stag Hunt (SH) game (T < 1 and S < 0). Let us
analyze what happens for each of the three games sepa-
rately. We start with the genuine PD where qualitative
differences with respect to the weak dilemma occur only
for values of S below a threshold S∗, a region in which
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FIG. 6: Average fraction of cooperating individuals ρc versus
S (T = 1.4, R = 1 and P = 0) for different values of the
mobility and ρ in the CDO case. The solid black line is the
case ρ = 1, while the vertical ones locate the transition points
for both ρ = 1 and ρ < 1 (see fig. 2 and text). Differently from
the COD case, mobility introduces new transitions (indicated
by vertical solid lines) at S = −3, −2, −1, −1/2, −1/3 and
0.
cooperation is completely extinguished in the presence of
mobility. This is reasonable since by increasing the pe-
nalization for the sucker’s behavior (decreasing S) one fi-
nally reaches a point below which C agents perform badly
and cannot overcome the filter of selection. For the COD
variant at T = 1.4, S∗ = −0.2 no matter the density ρ
and for all m > 0 considered. On the other hand, for the
CDO variant, S∗ depends strongly on ρ. It is remarkable
that, even for very severe sucker’s penalizations (down to
S = −2.5 in the figure, but whatever smaller value will
do, and since there is no further transition below S = −3,
even any negativelly large one), for intermediate values of
ρ (e.g. ρ = 0.5), the universal cooperation state (ρc = 1),
or a state very close to that, can still be attained.
In less severe dilemmas than the PD — mutual defec-
tion pays less than the sucker’s payoff in the SD, and
mutual cooperation pays more than cheating in the SH
— cooperation is, as one would have expected, in gen-
eral higher. In the case of the SD, cooperation is often
enhanced with respect to the weak dilemma with COD
dynamics, while an unprecedented state of universal co-
operation (ρc = 1) can be sometimes reached with the
CDO one. Hauert and Doebeli [11] noticed that cooper-
ation is often inhibited by spatial structure with ρc being
usually lower than its value in a randomly mixed popu-
lation, where for large systems one of the three solutions
ρc = S/(T+S−1), 0 or 1 is stable. Dilution and mobility
change dramatically this scenario. When only dilution
(but no mobility) is present, cooperation in a spatially
distributed system is higher than in the random mixed
limit either for intermediate densities or small values of
S. When mobility is added, only high densities follow
the behavior of the ρ = 1 situation where spatial struc-
ture inhibits cooperation. On the contrary, for not so
high densities cooperation is enhanced in the SD game
when m 6= 0. In this way, in the presence of mobile
agents, it is again possible to make the statement that
spatial structure promotes cooperation. In the COD SH,
the combination of mobility and large density (ρ ≥ 0.7)
leads to a boost in ρc or even to universal cooperation.
On the other hand, for smaller values of ρ, provided the
sucker’s payoff S is also small, ρc is lower. So a crucial
difference is that, for a given mobility, the level of coop-
eration grows with the density of agents, different from
the behavior at m = 0.
Accessing the actual payoff involved in real situations
is not an easy task, and it has been suggested that many
examples that have been interpreted as realizations of
the PD are also compatible with the SD and the SH
games (see [11, 23] and references therein). In addition
to this, mobility effects on the cooperation of real or-
ganisms are still largely unknown, as they are difficult
to isolate from other factors and, as the theoretical re-
sults presented here have shown, even a tiny amount of
mobility is able to produce very strong changes in the
final result. Although mobility may have an effect simi-
lar to noise, allowing shallow basins to be avoided, they
are not equivalent. For example, in Ref. [11], several
different dynamics, with and without noise, gave consis-
tent results for the inhibition of cooperation in the SD
game with spatial structure, while mobility drastically
changes this outcome. Since the results seem to strongly
depend on the chosen dynamics (although we have only
considered “Best-takes-over” updatings, it has two pos-
sible variants, CDO and COD), an important, yet open,
question concerns the existence of an unifying principle,
in Hamilton’s sense [9, 19], relating the parameters of the
game, that tells us when cooperative behavior might be
expected when mobile agents are present.
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